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Abstract. When we upload or create data into the cloud or the web,
we immediately lose control of our data. Most of the time, we will not
know where the data will be stored, or how many copies of our files are
there. Worse, we are unable to know and stop malicious insiders from ac-
cessing the possibly sensitive data. Despite being transferred across and
within clouds over encrypted channels, data often has to be decrypted
within the database for it to be processed. Exposing the data at some
point in the cloud to a few privileged users is undoubtedly a vendor-
centric approach, and hinges on the trust relationships data owners have
with their cloud service providers. A recent example of the abuse of the
trust relationship is the high-profile Edward Snowden case. In this pa-
per, we propose a user-centric approach which returns data control to
the data owners – empowering users with data provenance, transparency
and auditability, homomorphic encryption, situation awareness, revoca-
tion, attribution and data resilience. We also cover key elements of the
concept of user data control. Finally, we introduce how we attempt to
address these issues via the New Zealand Ministry of Business Innova-
tion and Employment (MBIE)-funded STRATUS (Security Technologies
Returning Accountability, Trust and User-centric Services in the Cloud)
research project.
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1 Rising Cyber Security Incidents: The Case for User
Data Control
From the Apple iCloud celebrity nude photo leaks [1], to the abuse of children’s
photographs on social networking services (e.g. Flickr and Facebook) for use of
explicit sites [2], to the recent adultery website Ashley Madison user information
leak [3], we are regularly witnessing a serious problem: the inability for data
owners to help themselves in cyber security breeches situations.
Underlying this problem, is a serious deficiency we are observing with the
current state of the cyber security industry: the inability for data owners to
control their data. When one gets compromised in a cyber security situation,
one usually has no idea how to proceed to understand the situation, analyse the
evidence and perhaps solve the situation (e.g. attribute and present compelling
evidence against the perpetuator of the attack).
1.1 Lack of Ability Stemming From Lack of Data Control
Looking deeper into the gap of ‘inability to help themselves’, we notice the root
of the issue is in the lack of control over the data they own, especially in the
cloud or simply over the web. Sometimes, users do not even realise that their
photographs taken from their mobile phone’s camera are uploaded instantly
onto public cloud storage, even though they may not have wanted those specific
photos to go onto the cloud (despite agreeing to the terms and conditions of the
application installation).
When we survey the landscape of cyber security tools, from the commonly
known ones such as anti-malware and firewalls, to the sophisticated vulnerability
scanners and penetration testing tools, none of them are built with the purpose
of empowering the users to comprehensively help themselves in controlling their
data’s whereabouts and privacy in hacking incidents. There is no reversal or
recourse.
1.2 Everyday Scenarios Demonstrating Users’ Lack of Data Control
In 2010, a 27-year-old Google site reliability engineer was caught spying on
teenagers on the GTalk service [4]. He abused his privileged administrator rights
and was only found out after the parents of a teenager reported him. According
to the Google, the extend of the damage or possible abuse is unknown, as there
is no technology tracking the evolution of data from a data-centric point of view.
There was also no technology which could alert the affected teenagers about the
unauthorised access from the backend of the cloud service.
With no real accountability of administrators’ rights over the access of clients’
data, many more situations like these potentially happen on a daily basis in (both
public and private) clouds utilised by businesses around the world. The sole re-
liance on the trust and reputation of a cloud service provider and their employees
is neither a strong nor sustainable way forward for the cloud computing industry.
2 Elements of User Data Control and Related Work
Returning control of data to users is a ‘holy grail’ of cloud security research
as it addresses trust tensions and accountability issues inherent in storing and
processing of proprietary data in cloud environments.
Solving this ‘holy grail’ will also carve out a niche in security technologies
around user control over their data through four proposed elements:
– Element 1 – Transparency and auditability of data,
– Element 2 – Privacy of data during processing and storing,
– Element 3 – Detection and revocation of malicious actions, and
– Element 4 – Resiliency and rapid recovery from untoward events.
Without all elements, the user cannot gain full control over their data, thus
both technical and compliance aspects around these four elements will need to
be addressed. We propose STRATUS (short for ‘Security Technologies Return-
ing Accountability, Trust and User-centric Services in the Cloud’), which will
address the four elements, i.e. Research Aims (RAs), each focusing on one of
these dimensions of user control of data. More details of STRATUS will be cov-
ered in Section 3 – Proposed Methodology. Before we delve into the STRATUS
approach, we will need to understand in-depth, the elements of user data control
in cloud environments. We will now provide a brief overview of the four main
elements.
2.1 Element 1: Transparency and Auditability of Data Activities
Element 1 enables cloud users to trace and reconstruct data provenance, i.e.
“what’s happened to their data” behind the scenes. Technologies enabling cloud
stakeholders to keep track of the provenance (i.e. derivation history) of their data
will be built – enabling them to know if malicious insiders have accessed their
data, or whether the users have leaked their important data to foreign systems.
Element 1 also covers the crucial governance aspects of cloud data and links
technical implementations with auditing and compliance guidelines, standards,
or regulations (e.g. CSA CCM [5], ISO27001 [6], PCI DSS [7]). From the global
security perspective, Moreover, Element 1 addresses the difficulty in tracking
criminals who use evasion and encryption techniques to mask their digital trails
and activities.
2.2 Element 2: Protection of Privacy of Data During Processing
and Storing
This Element addresses the issue of how users can ensure their data privacy
in clouds, without compromising search, functionality or analytical capability.
Currently, encrypted data cannot be processed or utilised meaningfully by com-
puting systems. Element 2 aims to overcome this by enabling encrypted data to
be utilised by cloud servers without revealing private data to the cloud system
administrators – thereby preserving privacy of data without compromising the
data utility.
2.3 Element 3: Immediate Detection and Revocation of Malicious
Actions
This Element has three objectives:
1. Providing ‘situational awareness’ tools enabling cloud stakeholders to have
real-time awareness of their data status.
2. New techniques that instantly reveal cloud software vulnerabilities and rem-
edy them ‘on the fly’. Current cloud technologies are protected by tradi-
tional but unsustainable methods (i.e. malware scanning using rule-based
techniques).
3. Capabilities to attribute threat sources and revoke anomalous actions, i.e.
achieving true control of one’s data.
2.4 Element 4: Resiliency and Rapid Recovery from Untoward
Events
Element 4’s main objective is to enable rapid recovery from untoward incidents,
malicious attacks and acts of nature. Due to a lack of work [8, 9] devoted to
defending business data from malicious attacks and from large scale disasters,
the following techniques will be developed: (1) techniques building resiliency
into services; (2) decentralised cloud storage, and (3) multi-cloud based disaster
recovery techniques. Tools that can be used in clouds to protect the availability
of data through a decentralised solution must be developed. The solution should
enable back-ups to be automatically replicated at multiple independent sites in
near real-time.
3 Proposed Methodology
As mentioned, the proposed STRATUS approach will be based on addressing
the above four key elements of user data control in clouds. STRATUS will create
a platform of novel user-centric cloud security technologies that can be used by
New Zealand companies to differentiate their products and services in global
markets.
Our over-arching research goal therefore is to create first-in-the-world to ex-
port cloud security technologies that enable users to be aware of, assess and
manage security events themselves. The research programme to deliver this com-
prises four ‘Research Aims’ (RAs), which are listed below. Each RA comprises
one to three projects, which represent more specific technology developments
as follows:
3.1 RA1: Transparency and Auditability of Data Activities in
Clouds
Project 1: Tracking and Reconstruction of Data Provenance
Aims – This project enables cloud users to know data provenance, or “what
has happened to their data” behind the scenes. Project 1 builds on Ko’s research
in cloud data provenance [10–14]. We will develop provenance tracking and recon-
struction techniques to support data incident investigations. We will also build
technologies that automate data-centric evidence acquisition and data forensics
tasks required in RA3.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – The project addresses cloud
data provenance and transparency of data activities. There is currently no ele-
gant solution to this problem [10] due to the following challenging scientific prob-
lems. First, current cloud monitoring tools [15–17] (e.g. HyTrust [17]) only mon-
itor utilisation and performance, and overlook data flow in clouds. Second, while
most clouds adopt file-integrity checking systems (FICS) (e.g. TripWire [18]) to
detect file intrusions, they do not track the history of changes and only report
the last change [19]. Third, existing data provenance techniques [10–12] are not
user-centric but vendor-centric [20]. There is also an absence of real-time prove-
nance and timeline reconstruction techniques to piece back data activities and
threat sources.
Methodology – We will focus on investigating research questions and devel-
oping proofs-of-concept using continuous hypothesis testing [21] within the Uni-
versity of Waikato (UoW)’s Cloud8 (large-scale cloud test-bed): (1) redesigning
cloud systems to embed provenance records in their metadata (2) design, patent
and implement cloud data access protocols (3) building data-centric logging,
provenance mining, and reconstruction mechanisms that collect provenance not
only within, but also outside clouds. The inventions will be verified against our
commercial collaborators. Then, they will be validated against real-life scenarios
and infrastructures provided by commercial collaborators. Finally, we will create
export advantages by building export-ready cloud data provenance services.
Project 2: Data Governance and Accountability in Clouds
Aims – This project complements Projects 1 and 7, as it covers the cloud
data governance and links technical implementations with auditing guidelines
and compliance regulations. This builds on the experience of two existing CSA
New Zealand Chapters research: (1) NZISM controls-mapping with unified secu-
rity and governance controls (e.g. ISO 27001/2, COBIT, PCI-DSS, NIST800-53,
BITS) (2) privacy requirements for data governance in New Zealand.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – This project primarily ad-
dresses the cross-border policy alignment and technology-to-policy alignment for
innovations invented in the four RAs. The governance controls of cloud service
providers do not support data sovereignty rights of cloud users [22–24]. Existing
standards (ISO 27001, COBIT, ISO 38500, NIST 800-53, NZISM, PCI-DSS) do
not offer controls that can accredit and audit cloud user cloud architecture for
data governance. Governments have highlighted this pressing need in various
documents [25, 26].
Methodology – Comparative analyses of standards, legal controls and best
practices will be conducted. Controls from our analysis will be documented ac-
cording to the Deming (Plan-Do-Check-Act: PDCA) Cycle [27] as a first draft.
Next, we will have two consultation rounds with industry (e.g. NZICT) and New
Zealand Government (i.e. DIA, NZTE, ATEED). The unified framework draft
will be accomplished. This draft will be sent to ISO committees, government and
industry for review. The controls’ validity will be tested by integration with soft-
ware created by all RAs. Then, we will focus on publishing recommendations into
international standardisation bodies (e.g. ISO, ITU-T). Finally, Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) (which is one of STRATUS research collaborators) will link up
commercial collaborators to CSA corporate members, establishing a first-mover
advantage and global market.
3.2 RA2: Protection of Privacy of Data During Processing and
Storing
Project 3: Secure Information Retrieval / Encrypted Search
Aims – This project will first provide data centre owners with new storage
tools that allows search operations on encrypted data and provide stakeholders
tools for statistical analysis and testing of cloud data while preserving privacy
at a granular level. This project builds on the University of Auckland’s cur-
rent work [28]. We will combine previous results on proxy-encryption for simple
search operations in a multiuser setting [29–31] with our latest work [28, 32–38]
supporting complex matching operations and indexing extensions.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – The main scientific principles
addressed are cryptographic schemes which protect data confidentiality while
supporting search operations on encrypted data. Current solutions either (1)
support only simple queries based on equality matches (e.g. “Name=John”) but
not complex queries based on ranges (e.g. 18<Age<65), or (2) require users to
share keys, complicating key management, i.e. requiring regular key regeneration.
Related works have only partially solved these two issues. For example, single-
user searchable encryption schemes [39–41] only work well for single users, while
semi-fledged multi-user schemes [42–45] force other users to only perform ‘read’
operations if a user ‘writes’. More recently, full-fledged multi-user schemes allow
multiple users to ‘write’ and ‘read’ without sharing keys [29–31] but only support
keyword-based searches. We aim to support both complex queries and do not
require users to share keys.
Methodology – We will define security requirements, business cases, and
create partial prototypes based on our previous research [28]. Next, we will de-
ploy a fully working mechanism and study indexing techniques enabling lower
latencies for data retrieval. Our commercial collaborators will provide require-
ments, business cases and access to dedicated hardware. Indexing will be inte-
grated to the search mechanism; a tool which minimises data exposure while
doing fast indexing will be implemented. Then, we will integrate and validate on
thin-clients with constrained resources (e.g. battery), and implement client-side
crypto schemes. Finally, search optimisation and parallel execution extensions
will be built.
Project 4: Efficient Privacy and Utility Preserving Encryption
Aims – This project attempts to achieve an efficient, practical method
for a major scientific breakthrough: Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) [46, 47]. FHE allows computers to process data without the need to de-
crypt them, thereby solving all cloud data privacy concerns. However, FHE is
currently inefficient and impractical (∼ 15 mins/1 kilobyte) [47]. Therefore, there
are opportunities to introduce innovation that gives New Zealand cloud providers
a competitive advantage. We will focus on implementing practical homomorphic
cryptographic mechanisms for supporting meaningful computation on encrypted
data, e.g. statistical functions.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – FHE’s drawback is that it
requires huge ciphertext and cryptographic material that is not practical with
today’s computational power. Recently, small optimisations have been proposed
[48, 49]. Although these optimisations require smaller ciphertexts to work they
are still far from being practical in a cloud environment serving large amount of
users. Close to our approach is [47]. However, it is not ideal for corporates with
numerous employees requiring access to the encrypted service. Pragmatically,
our solutions will adopt partial homomorphic encryption (PHE), which supports
a subset of well-defined operations. PHE is efficient in term of computation
time. Furthermore, PHE can provide the same level of security as FHE. Our
idea is that combining several PHE solutions supporting a range of operations
can provide enough computation power to be used in several sectors including
finance, healthcare and government. We will build from our previous work based
on proxy encryption and Elgamal crypto blocks [29, 32, 33, 38].
Methodology – We will define security and functional requirements with
business requirements and study related cryptographic schemes. A prototype
with different functions will be implemented, tested and evaluated. Then, the
prototypes will be optimised and delivered as SaaS products. Next, we will imple-
ment the support of thin-clients and provide a platform for integrating different
providers’ services.
3.3 RA3. Awareness and Response to Anomalous Data Activities
Project 5: Real-time Situational Awareness
Aims – This project will draw from UoW’s decade of machine learning (ML)
experience (i.e. Weka [50]) , and passive network measurement and anomaly de-
tection expertise [51–54] to develop new techniques enabling cloud stakeholders
with real-time situational awareness (SA) of their data. SA is a top priority in
several defence organizations globally [55], as there is currently a lack of tech-
niques for instant identification of trouble spots in the cloud [56]. We will apply
ML techniques to develop actionable insights to improve SA.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – The ability to detect and
report anomalous actions is the basis for notifying cloud stakeholders abnormal
data provenance behaviour [57]. This permits active corrective actions rather
than reactive. Cloud systems are also live and dynamic [10] – instances are live
or shut down in ad hoc fashion. Therefore, accurately detecting and reporting
abnormal behaviours from large-scale measurements with zero false positives is
an open problem. SA needs to perform well with large data volumes, differen-
tiate between harmless and malicious anomalies, and detect covert or stealthy
information flows.
Methodology – Anomalous events will be identified and classified. Algo-
rithms for effective detection over large datasets will also be developed. Next, the
classifications and algorithms are combined to test against commercial collabo-
rators and experimental findings from RA1. Finally, we will build export-ready
cloud SA services integrated with the STRATUS platform.
Project 6: Effective Cloud Vulnerability Scanning
Aims – This project will develop new techniques to instantly reveal and
remediate from cloud security vulnerabilities. Virtualization in clouds increase
scale and utilization of infrastructures but brings about new complexities and
vulnerabilities. Currently, clouds are protected by traditional methods designed
for single machines (i.e. malware scanning using rule-based techniques, firewalls);
these are not sustainable. Our work builds on Ko’s existing research on Cloud
failures [58] and his collaborative research with Bell Labs on cloud reliability.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – This project will create
a cloud vulnerability scanning kit which will enable security consultants, cloud
service provider and cloud user (e.g. SaaS companies) to identify and recommend
remedies for both software [59, 60] and network vulnerabilities [61] efficiently. In
the area of networks, work on addressing Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)-
related vulnerabilties (e.g. firewalls deployed for IPv4 only, transiting from IPv4
to IPv6) are lacking . Existing work include the SecureCloud [62], RedShield [63],
software fuzzers [59, 60] and the THC IPv6 vulnerability scanning toolkit [61].
However, they are not ready for clouds’ live and dynamic nature [11]. The main
challenges stem from the widespread usage of virtualisation and software defined
networks in clouds.
Methodology – We will automate fast and efficient malware analysis that
traces back and attributes sources to empower law enforcement and prevent
future outbreaks. Next, we will focus on classifying vulnerability types, and
develop a suite of proofs-of-concept for each vulnerability type. Then, we will
focus on tool productisation. Finally, we will build cloud vulnerability scanning
suites for commercial collaborators.
Project 7: Attribution and Revocation of Actions
Aims – This project builds on data from Projects 1, 2 and 5. Cloud stake-
holders would have abilities to identify the actors or malware behind each cloud
data anomaly, and revoke malicious actions, i.e. achieving true control of one’s
data. We will also develop the ability to cyber “fingerprint” attackers through
identification and detection of their behaviours, and techniques. This automates
repetitive tasks such as evidence collation, reducing workload of investigators.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – The principles addressed
are identity management, access control [64–66], and revocation policies [67, 68].
Related work such as sticky policies, EnCoRe and revocation schemes often run
into scale and latency problems [67, 69]. We aim to overcome these limitations
to achieve near real-time control and policy implementation.
Methodology – We will focus on: (1) classification of identity types of
all granularities within cloud systems, (2) development of access control poli-
cies which adhere to international auditing regulations identified by Project 2,
and (3) building of proofs-of-concepts of attribution techniques. Our attribution
techniques will be validated against our New Zealand commercial collaborators.
3.4 RA4. Resiliency and Recovery of Data
Project 8: Rapid Disaster Recovery (DR) Infrastructure
Aims – This project will develop capabilities for efficient data protection
and rapid recovery from untoward incidents, malicious attacks and acts of na-
ture. This project builds on prior work on decentralised network federation sys-
tems [70] at Unitec’s Centre for Computational Intelligence for Cyber-Security.
Gaps & Scientific Principles Addressed – The project primarily ad-
dresses the challenge of business continuity via data resiliency and recovery mech-
anisms [8]. Applications must rapidly come back online after a failure occurs to
minimise losses. Two existing mechanisms: (1) network reconfiguration [9, 71, 72],
and (2) virtual machine migration or cloning [73] operate at service or platform
layer but none connects DR to the infrastructure layer or consider geographic
and network-topological locations. Citrix [73] and Pokharel et al. [74] considered
secondary cloud infrastructures for disaster recovery but they require extra phys-
ical sites, i.e. higher costs. As such, we will (1) build resiliency into services (2)
create decentralized cloud storage techniques and (3) create multi-cloud based
disaster recovery techniques.
Methodology – We will build resilient services focusing on business con-
tinuity. Then, we will develop automated data distribution techniques that de-
centralises data storage and achieves cost reduction. Next, we will setup an
industry-grade disaster recovery infrastructure, enable seamless integration of
existing clouds as part of single wide-area resource leasing federation and a
structured peer-to-peer routing method.
4 Opportunities for Cloud Security: A Technology
Platform with Multiple Applications
STRATUS not only has the potential to achieve the elements of data control, but
also establish, maintain and continually develop a wide portfolio of user-centric
cloud security technologies.
Some examples include the development of user-centric data provenance
tracking tools, which can inform the whereabouts of data to their owners. Other
examples include a fully homomorphic range of cloud applications for the health-
care, banking and government sectors – reducing the reliance and risk trusting
of cloud computing privileged system administrators.
The ability to know about users’ data also empowers us with the potential
ability to revocate and attribute malicious activities, giving full control of data
to users.
This mix of user-centric cloud technologies, skills and resources will comprise
the STRATUS platform. Our goal is for the combination of successful, real world
‘proofs-of-concept’ with supporting resources to ensure easy access for exporters
and domestic users alike.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this position paper, we presented STRATUS, a New Zealand cyber security
research project focusing on empowering users with control over their data in
third party environments such as the cloud. We will create a platform of novel
security tools, techniques and capabilities which return control of data to cloud
computing users. Such innovations empowering users to have data control offer
opportunities for companies across the cloud computing value system.
We proposed four elements of security technologies around user control over
their data including (1) transparency and auditability of data, (2) privacy of
data during processing and storing, (3) detection and revocation of malicious
actions, and (4) resiliency and rapid recovery from untoward events. When all
elements are addressed, we will return data control to users. It is our proposition
that for the cloud to be a truly trustable service, cloud service providers must
not be data owners but data processors.
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